INTRODUCTION
The Kable principle is a doctrine of federalism. This deceptively simple truth has been obscured in the 15 years since the seminal decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) . 3 In that time, the constitutional imperative of the 'institutional integrity' of state courts has emerged as the touchstone of the principle and has come to be understood as a function of the 'defining characteristics' -or 'attributes' -of a court. The Kable principle now articulates what is and what is not court-like. Accordingly, the considerations it engages are cognate with conceptions of the separation of powers rather than conceptions of federalism. This article seeks to recover the understanding of the Kable principle as an expression of federalism conceptions: one that is as much about 'state' courts as it is about state 'courts'.
The principle should be stated at the outset. Attempts at neat formulation, however, risk being either over-or under-inclusive. For now, it suffices to say that the principle disables legislatures from impairing the 'institutional integrity' of non-federal courts capable of receiving federal jurisdiction, 4 whether impairment be inflicted by conferring an incompatible function, 5 removing an essential function, 6 altering impermissibly the court's composition, 7 modifying repugnantly the court's procedures 34
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ capacities to function as governments, 17 including the capacity to constitute and organise their own courts. 18 The second commitment is to the 'integrated' Australian judicial system -which is neither unitary nor categorically federal, but within a spectrum of intermediate possibilities -and to the 'role and existence [of state courts] which transcends their status as courts of the States'. 19 Reconciling these two commitments is an exercise in federalism. It raises a cluster of questions about the extent to which courts form a part of the constitutional conception of a state, how much power states should have over state courts and how much and in what respects diversity may be tolerated between the courts of the federation. Depending upon one's particular vision of the federal structure and the place of the courts within it, the answers to those and related questions differ, and the accommodation of the two conflicting commitments expresses differently. The article does not undertake the synthetic tasks of defending particular answers to the cluster of federalism questions, or advancing any one particular vision of the federal structure. It invites attention to those tasks, but is itself analytic, seeking to demonstrate why and how the questions and contested visions matter, in ways that are insufficiently appreciated.
To comprehend different visions of the federal structure, the article introduces a concept it calls the 'attribution' of a court. As reflected in the title, a court's 'attribution' is to be distinguished from its 'attributes', the identification of which engages with separation-of-powers concerns. 'Attribution', developed in detail in due course, engages instead with federalism. It captures the sense in which an institution such as a court is recognised as an emanation of, or belonging to, an identifiable body politic. Stronger and weaker conceptions of the attribution of state courts to state bodies politic exist within Australian constitutional thought. Reconciling the contested conceptions, rather than defining the characteristics of courts -that is to say, theorising the attribution, rather than the attributes, of state courts -is the central, but virtually invisible, problematic of the Kable principle.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I constructs the analytical framework, describing how twin commitments to autonomous states and integrated courts produce competing visions of the federal judicature; how conceptions of 'attribution' enhance the description and understanding of those competing visions; and how the Kable principle relates. Part II evaluates the ascendant account of the Kable principle, explaining the emergence of, and critiquing, the attributes-based understanding. Part III shows how conceptions of the attribution of state courts usefully supplement the ascendant account of the Kable principle and explain puzzling contours of the doctrine over time.
Part IV is somewhat discrete. It offers a novel explanation of why there has been relative inattention to conceptions of federalism. By examining the oral submissions made by the Commonwealth Attorney-General intervening in Kable cases, 20 
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35 ____________________________________________________________________________________ considerations and the rise of separation-of-powers analysis. After Kable itself, the Commonwealth, for reasons to be explained, came to side with the states rather than against them, thereby masking the federal complexion of the Kable principle. Since 2009, and coinciding with the Kable principle's revival (albeit imperfectly), the Commonwealth's position has been more nuanced and it has intervened in key cases contrary to state interests. This may be reversing the earlier suppression of federalism considerations. This part of the article illuminates s 78A 21 intervention positions as an under-utilised resource for the study of constitutional law, and particularly federalism issues, offering a rough template for other systematic evaluations of the influence upon evolving legal principles of the patterns in long-term governmental interests.
I CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS: AUTONOMOUS STATES AND INTEGRATED COURTS
A Constitutional framework The Constitution contemplates the existence of both state and federal courts. Chapter III assumes the continuation, as 'State' courts, of the colonial judicial systems existing immediately prior to federation. 22 The Constitution also assigns to 'federal' jurisdiction nine enumerated classes of matter 23 and makes provision for the investment of that jurisdiction, 24 including by empowering the federal Parliament to define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts it may create. 25 The constitutional architecture has been described as 'draw[ing] the clearest distinction between federal Courts and State Courts'. 26 Comprised of apparently distinct state and federal institutions, the Australian judicial system is not unitary. The Commonwealth and states each possess power to create courts and are responsible for the maintenance of 'their own' judicial apparatus. Professor Saunders described Australia, in terms later adopted by the High Court, as a 'federation of a dualist kind'. 27 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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The 'dualist' theory of the federation resonates with 'the constitutional conception of the Commonwealth and states as constituent entities of the federal structure'. 28 There is an entrenched commitment to the continued existence of the states as bodies politic, possessed of the constitutional capacities necessary to function as governments. 29 State judicial institutions are understood to be components of the states in their constitutional conception, at least in the sense that a state's capacity to function as a government is understood to include the capacity to organise 'its own' courts and 'its own' judges. 30 The structural implication is well-understood to limit Commonwealth legislative power, which is granted 'subject to [the] Constitution'. 31 Less well-understood is its parallel effect, explored in this article, of confining the reach of implied limitations upon state legislative power.
There is a competing constitutional commitment in the integrated system of courts. Despite the 'dualist' federation, state and federal courts do not operate in exclusive spheres as discrete systems. Profound commonalities and shared objectives exist between state and federal courts, and are widely recognised. First, legislation giving effect to s 77(iii) of the Constitution, 32 invests federal jurisdiction in state courts. State courts are thereby empowered 'to act as the judicial agent[s] of the Commonwealth' 33 and for most of federated Australia's history were the primary repositories of federal jurisdiction. 34 Secondly, the courts of one state may exercise the jurisdiction of a different state under cross-vesting legislation. 35 Thirdly, although unable to receive non-federal jurisdiction, 36 a federal court may adjudicate the entirety of a 'matter' within jurisdiction, including any claims that form part of the matter though they arise under non-federal law. 37 38 while s 79, subject to contrary federal laws and in prescribed circumstances, causes state and territory laws to be picked up and applied 'as federal law'. 39 Thus, 'non-federal law is part of the single, composite body of law applicable alike to cases determined in the exercise of federal jurisdiction and to cases determined in the exercise of non-federal jurisdiction.' 40 Fifthly, giving a national complexion to the judicial hierarchy, the High Court is possessed of appellate jurisdiction not only in federal matters but also in respect of all 'judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences … of the Supreme Court of any State'. 41 Since the abolition of all appeals to the Privy Council by 1986, 42 the High Court has stood at the apex of that national hierarchy. Sixthly, and relatedly, one intermediate appellate court is bound to follow another, unless 'plainly wrong', on a question of common law or on the interpretation of Commonwealth or uniform legislation. 43 A trial court is similarly bound by another jurisdiction's appellate court, 44 and perhaps its trial courts as well. Cultural commonalities may run even deeper than these strictly legal ones. They are reflected, for example, in the existence and missions of the Judicial Conference of Australia and National Judicial College of Australia, and in recent experimentation with 'exchange' programs between different courts. 45 Australia's non-unitary judicial system is not adequately described by the adjective 'federal', if that word is to be understood 'categorically' -that is, as though there are very clear demarcations between 'what is truly national and what is truly local'. 46 The foregoing observations compel the conclusion that the judicial system is neither unitary nor categorically federal, but of an intermediate character. Commitment to the idea that a state's courts are 'its own' may conflict with, or be in tension with, commitment to the idea that those courts are part of an 'integrated' whole. 
on what 'integration' entails, and that is contestable: 'In a federation, references to a national legal or court system mean different things to different people.' 47 One of constitutional law's tasks, in mediating the contestation, is to envision and give effect to the nature and incidents of the 'integrated' judicial system, in the context of a federation committed to the continued existence of its states. This, I will explain, was the central insight of Kable.
Before coming to that decision, however, it is convenient to introduce the concept of the 'attribution' of a court. This will serve two purposes: it will aid description of the relationship between state courts and state bodies politic; and it will lend to the comprehension of an 'integrated' judicial system (neither unitary nor categorically federal) a vocabulary more apposite than the dichotomous language of 'state' and 'federal'.
B
Attribution of courts An ordinary meaning of 'attribution', according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, is the 'ascription of a quality etc. as belonging or proper to a person or thing'. 48 The concept should be familiar enough: at some point, each of us has engaged, for example, in the attribution of blame to a wrongdoer, the attribution of a work to its author, 49 or the attribution of an effect to its cause. Attribution is an ordinary concept that arises in countless ordinary contexts.
Identifying courts as 'state' and 'federal' engages us analogously in an ordinary attribution of institutions to bodies politic. We say 'this court is Tasmanian', or 'that court is federal' and so attribute the court to one of the federation's constituent units. But to say 'this court is Tasmanian', as though that were the whole truth, denies the integrated nature of the judiciary; it is to speak as though the judicial system were categorically federal. Equally, it is only partially true to describe the same court as simply 'Australian', for the judicial system is not unitary. When we attribute courts to polities in this loose way, we speak imprecisely. The proper attribution of a court is a matter of degree. Just as our attribution of blame to a wrongdoer, of a work to an author, or of an effect to a cause, may be stronger or weaker in the circumstances, so our attribution of a court to a polity may be stronger or weaker, depending upon our vision of the integrated judicial system. The more categorically federal our vision, the more strongly we will attribute courts to polities. Conversely, the more unitary our vision, the more weakly we will attribute courts. So-understood, the gradated concept of attribution captures something essential about the intermediate character of the integrated judicial system, which stands in some degree between unitary and federal ideal-types.
Stronger is the integrated Australian judicial system more accurately described by a stronger or weaker conception of the attribution of courts? This article does not defend any particular answer to that question. The argument is that the question matters. Normative commitments to a particular conception of the attribution of state courts, whatever that conception might be, affect the approach to some large questions of federalism. A central purpose of the article is to bring to light the possibilities such commitments might entail.
Although no particular conception of the attribution of courts is to be defended, five general observations may be made. The first observation is that conceptions of attribution enable a 'federalism perspective' on the constitutional expression 'court of a State'. In Kable, Gummow J described the reference to 'Supreme Court' in s 73 of the Constitution as a 'constitutional expression'. 51 With the extension of the Kable principle to lower state courts, 52 there is no reason to suppose that the reference in s 77(iii) to a 'court of a State' is any less a 'constitutional expression'. Forge emphasised the significance of continuing 'to meet the constitutional description' 53 and Chief Justice J J Spigelman recently described 'the concept of a "constitutional expression" as a textual foundation for imbuing many constitutional provisions with new substantive content'. 54 'Attribution' is a useful tool for this interpretive task because, while separation-of-powers precepts grapple with what it means to be a 'court of a State', constitutional law has, so far, had less to say about what it means to be a 'court of a State' within the federal structure.
The second observation is that conceptions of attribution are not themselves determined by the text and structure of the Constitution. Attribution engages simultaneous commitments to autonomous states and integrated courts, which, though having textual bases, are 'not embodied in textually specific prohibitions … [but] simply contain public values that must be given concrete meaning and harmonized with the general structure of the Constitution.' 55 For this reason, textualist objections to the utility of 'attribution' may be anticipated, but I proceed on an acceptance of the core of the critique of textual determinism. 56 The third observation is that a strong conception of attribution enjoys orthodoxy. The reasons for the orthodox understanding of state courts as institutions attributable to the states go beyond the superficial obviousness of state courts being 'state' courts. Judicial power is understood canonically as 'the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property'. 57 While imprecision is well-recognised in that part of the formulation dealing with 'deciding controversies', 58 the part of the formulation designating judicial power as something a 'sovereign' 'has' is deeply embedded. Thus, it is said that '[w]hat gives courts the authority to decide a matter is the law of the polity of the courts concerned … The authority to decide comes from the sovereign authority concerned, not from some other source.' 59 The fourth observation is that the orthodox conception should not be thought to be beyond critique. After all, it is difficult to identify the constituent units of the federation with the 'sovereign authority', given that the High Court 'has not accepted for over 80 years' the 'view taken from time to time in the United States of distinct and dual sovereignty', 60 and given also that 'the Crown is not an element in the Judicature established by Ch III'. 61 Developments in twentieth-century jurisprudence point in the direction of an explanation. When Griffith CJ ventured his definition of judicial power, the prevailing Austinian theory of law took as its paradigm an identifiable sovereign, issuing commands backed by threats. 62 Within that paradigm, the commands of a court would not qualify as 'law' unless the court itself were understood to be an extension of (attributable to) the sovereign. This view is no longer widely held. In 1961, H L A Hart influentially re-conceptualised law as rule-based norms deriving from a conventional 'rule of recognition'. 63 In describing the rule of recognition for the United Kingdom, Hart accorded the courts independent ____________________________________________________________________________________ conventional status. 64 A similar view has been expressed in the United States, 65 and could be reached in Australia. 66 Properly describing the attribution of state courts is a complex task, requiring close attention to contested factors including their constitutional standing, their relationship with other branches of both state and federal governments, their legal, professional and cultural relationships with each other and with federal courts, the similarities and differences between all kinds of court in form and function, and in powers and liabilities. Proper description may also invite attention to the different dimensions of a 'court': its physical and administrative apparatus, as distinct from its judges, from its jurisdiction, from powers and functions it exercises, and so on. The proper attribution of the court as an institution may depend upon the emphases given to the different institutional components, and the conception of attribution might properly be stronger in some respects than in others.
The fifth observation is that there exist within constitutional thought weaker conceptions of attribution, which challenge or qualify the orthodoxy. In their strongest expression, these conceptions are aspirational rather than descriptive, and date back at least as far as Sir Owen Dixon's call for national courts, neither state nor federal, in his evidence to the Royal Commission on the Constitution. 67 Other expressions claim to be descriptive. They include Sir William Deane's overarching view of Australian law, described as a 'broad conception of "a unitary national system of law" within which the courts and judicial proceedings of every part of the Commonwealth should be seen as integral parts of one consistent and coherent whole'; 68 the insistence upon a single, national common law (neither state nor federal) applied throughout Australia; 69 and the premises supporting the Kable principle. These weaker conceptions have developed only in recent decades. As such, strong conceptions are not only orthodox, but also traditional. This circumstance defines the dynamics of the relationship between strong and weak conceptions of attribution: in the absence of good reason to adopt a weaker conception, and equally in the absence of attention to the contestation between stronger and weaker conceptions of attribution, the strong conception, being the status quo, typically will prevail.
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Kable principle Serving a term of imprisonment for the manslaughter of his wife, Gregory Kable wrote letters threatening to harm his children and their custodian. The New South Wales legislature responded with the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) ('CPA'), which purported to confer upon the Supreme Court of New South Wales power to make in respect of a specified person a 'preventive detention order', on the application of the DPP, if satisfied upon reasonable grounds that the person was 'more likely than not to commit a serious act of violence' and that it was appropriate for the protection of a person, or the community generally, that the specified person be detained. Though expressed in general terms, the power was confined by another provision of the CPA to making orders in respect only of 'Gregory Wayne Kable', so-named in the legislation. Subjected to a preventive detention order, Mr Kable successfully challenged the validity of the CPA.
Sir Maurice Byers QC, a former Commonwealth Solicitor-General, appeared for Mr Kable and launched multiple fronts of attack on the extraordinary statute. Sir Maurice did not win the case by appeal to conceptions of the separation of powers. Although the power to order detention otherwise than as punishment following conviction for a criminal offence may not be judicial in character, its conferral upon the Supreme Court is not for that reason prohibited, in the absence of a constitutional separation of powers. Sir Maurice did not argue otherwise, 70 and his separate argument, that the CPA itself purported to be an exercise of judicial power, failed. 71 The challenge succeeded by an adaptation from the federal to the state context of the incompatibility doctrine recognised in Grollo v Palmer, 72 according to which a federal judge (who operates in a milieu respecting a strict separation of judicial power) may perform nonjudicial functions as persona designata 73 provided those functions are not incompatible with judicial office. 74 The adaptation fixed upon the Court's capacity to exercise federal jurisdiction. 75 The CPA was invalid not because the power it conferred on the Supreme Court was non-judicial, but because the power was incompatible with or repugnant to the Supreme Court's federal constitutional position.
Stephen Gageler SC, the incumbent Commonwealth Solicitor-General, has written of Sir Maurice's vision of the Constitution's structure and function and its permeation of legal doctrine. 76 Kable is one illustration of the translation into law of part of that vision, specifically, a vision of the integrated character of the judicial system. Sir Maurice's core insight, succinctly captured in his exchange with Dawson J, reproduced , illustrate that an actual engagement of federal jurisdiction is not necessary and that the imperative of institutional integrity flows at most from the court's capacity to exercise, and probably no more than the court's liability to be invested with, federal jurisdiction. 76 Gageler, above n 56, 138-40.
2012
Attributes and Attribution of State Courts
43 ____________________________________________________________________________________ at the beginning of this article, was that state and federal courts are constitutionally equal repositories of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and, in that 'fundamental respect', not relevantly different from each other. This particular equality underpinned the translation of the incompatibility doctrine into the state sphere. In the reasons for judgment, the pithiest expression of the idea is Gaudron J's famous observation that 'there is nothing anywhere in the Constitution to suggest that it permits of different grades or qualities of justice, depending on whether judicial power is exercised by State courts or federal courts'. 77 The insight in Kable that state courts, like federal judges, are subject to constitutional limitations on the kinds of functions they can perform qualified in a significant respect the earlier orthodoxy that since the investment of Commonwealth judicial power in state courts is at the option of Parliament, state courts must be taken as found. 78 The Court was also deeply conscious of the recognition in the Constitution that state and federal courts are different institutions. That idea underpinned the dissenting opinions, 79 but was evident also in the majority reasons. 80 Kable exposed the fundamental tension within the idea of the attribution of state courts:
 state courts are 'creatures of the States'; 81 but  state courts 'have a role and existence which transcends their status as courts of the States'. 82 The first part of the dichotomy reflects the commitment to autonomous states and pulls towards a categorically federal vision of the judicial system and a strong conception of the attribution of courts. The second part reflects the commitment to integrated courts and pulls towards a unitary vision and weak conception of attribution. Negotiating this tension is fundamental to the Kable principle and implicates directly the question of the proper attribution of state courts. Far from settling the attribution question, Kable was but the first step in taking it up.
Despite no shortage of ' [i]f the conclusion for which the appellants contend truly followed from the principle, then the principle would require reconsideration.' 87 But such remarks do not represent the overall tenor of the case-law, even in the pre-2009 period. The Court's apparent reluctance to invalidate legislation should be read together with its apparent enthusiasm for granting special leave and for reaffirming, refining and even extending the understanding of the Kable principle. The importance of the principle was repeatedly asserted, even though it became increasingly difficult to expect any kind of state legislation to be invalidated. Professor Wheeler described the principle in 2005 as 'under-performing' in 'clarity and predictability'. 88 The principle itself was not in retreat, but its application accumulated a kind of inertia. When, in 2009, Kable was revived in International Finance, 89 and when it was invoked again in Kirk, 90 Totani, 91 Wainohu, 92 and by three judges in Momcilovic, 93 the shift was, again, one in robustness of application. More will be said about the inertia of the Kable principle, and its nascent revival, when later I come to explain how changing conceptions of attribution account for the principle's waning and waxing periods.
II ATTRIBUTES OF STATE COURTS: THE ASCENDANT ACCOUNT
A Emergence of 'defining characteristics' Kable held to be invalid the conferral upon the New South Wales Supreme Court of a function 'incompatible' with its status as a repository of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The criteria for ascertaining 'incompatibility' were not immediately clear after Kable and two views emerged. On one view, incompatibility was to be identified in an impairment of 'public confidence' in the impartiality and independence of the state judiciary. This reflected a position most identifiable with the approach of McHugh J, who had held that since 'ordinary reasonable members of the public might reasonably have seen the [CPA] as making the Supreme Court a party to and responsible for implementing the political decision of the executive government … public confidence in the impartial administration of the judicial functions of the Supreme Court must inevitably be impaired.' 94 On a second view, identifying incompatibility depended not upon the mediating construct of the 'ordinary reasonable members of the public' 95 requirements of an independent and impartial judiciary to exercise federal judicial power. For example, Gummow J described the CPA as 'repugnant to the judicial process in a fundamental degree' 96 and inflicting upon the judicial power of the Commonwealth 'institutional impairment'. 97 These two views, and their representation in the literature, are identified in an early article by Hardcastle. 98 The persistence of both views is evident in Bradley, 99 in which the appellant's counsel put his submissions both in terms of the constitutionally required attributes of a court and in terms of 'the perception test in Kable'. 100 The plurality reasons also invoked both understandings of the principle. 101 Not four months later, in Baker 102 and Fardon, 103 'institutional integrity' emerged explicitly as the true touchstone of the principle. Impaired public confidence was clarified to be but an indicator of impaired institutional integrity: although in some of the cases considering the application of Kable, institutional integrity and public confidence perhaps may have appeared as distinct and separately sufficient considerations, that is not so. Perception as to the undermining of public confidence is an indicator, but not the touchstone, of invalidity; the touchstone concerns institutional integrity. 104 The transformation of the Kable principle into its current expression as a protection of the attributes of a court was completed in Forge. 105 In that case, institutional integrity was explained in terms of the 'defining characteristics' of a court: the relevant principle is one which hinges upon maintenance of the defining characteristics of a 'court', or in cases concerning a Supreme Court, the defining characteristics of a State Supreme Court. It is to those characteristics that the reference to 'institutional integrity' alludes. That is, if the institutional integrity of a court is distorted, it is because the body no longer exhibits in some relevant respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies. 106 'Public confidence' was mentioned only in the reasons of Kirby J and Heydon J and then only to repeat that it was not the touchstone of invalidity. 107 Since Forge, references to 'public confidence' have been of a similar quality. Of course, the discredited criterion of public confidence should not be confused with considerations 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ of public perception, including apprehended dependence or bias, which may compromise institutional integrity and so remain relevant to Kable analysis. 108 Forge should be recognised as the point at which, quite explicitly, the task of marking courts 'apart from other decision-making bodies' emerged as the analytical key to the Kable principle.
This development of principle, by placing central importance on the 'defining characteristics' or attributes that distinguish courts from other institutions, has given prominence to separation-of-powers precepts -not in any sense of constitutional sequestration, but in a looser sense of articulating what makes courts and judicial powers identifiable as such. Conceptions of federalism and the attribution of courts, though central to Kable itself, have been rendered peripheral. This is problematic, because, as the next section contends, the account of attributes is insufficient to explain the Kable principle's operation.
B
Explanatory insufficiency of 'defining characteristics' Three points of critique are made in turn. First, statements of the defining characteristics of a court are statements of conclusion, not in themselves illuminating. Secondly, there are competing methodologies for the identification of 'defining characteristics' and the dominant historicist methodology suffers important limitations. Thirdly, the identification of a 'defining characteristic' does not answer the pivotal constitutional question in a Kable challenge, which requires evaluative judgment on whether the impugned statute's impairment of that characteristic is so substantial or repugnant as to cause invalidity.
1
Statements of conclusion To understand the Kable principle as a theory of the attributes of a court is to understand only the results the principle dictates, rather than the reasons that engage it. To state that a particular attribute of a court is protected from legislative impairment -because it is an 'essential' or 'defining' attribute -is to state a conclusion, not a reason or justification. In diverse contexts has been exposed the inutility of conclusory statements previously thought to bear explanatory weight. For example, in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority, 109 it was said that the classification of statutory procedural requirements as 'mandatory' or 'directory' merely 'records a conclusion reached on other grounds' and 'is the end of the inquiry, not the beginning'. 110 The High Court has explained more recently that similar difficulties attend the classification of administrative decisions as 'invalid' or 'nullities', 111 and, in yet another context, led to the decline of 'proximity' as a useful concept in the law of negligence. 112 Most appositely for present purposes, it has been observed: Although in fact addressed to the construction of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), the same could be said in relation to the ascendant understanding of the Kable principle. Courts have many characteristics, or as I have been calling them, attributes. Undoubtedly, some are properly considered to be 'essential' and others 'accidental'. But the identification of an attribute as 'essential', or 'defining', is the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. The inquiry itself must depend upon recourse to other sources of legal principle.
2
History and theory What are legitimate sources of legal principle is a perennial theme of constitutional argument: apart from the primary sources of text and structure, other candidate sources, including history, theory, policy, community values, foreign law and international law all vie for attention with varying degrees of persuasiveness and success. This is not the occasion to engage widely with the sources debates. There is, however, an important cleft within the Kable cases between historicist and theoretical methodologies. The post-Kable rise of historicist methodology and the eschewal of theory is one reason why a theory of the attribution of state courts, though central to the decision in Kable, has since been marginalised while an account of the attributes of state courts has assumed prominence.
In 1998, Hardcastle described between and within the majority judgments in Kable a difference between 'purposive' and 'intentionalist' constructions of the relevant constitutional provisions. 114 According to Hardcastle, the purposive approach resembled what in 1993 the Solicitor-General (now Chief Justice) of South Australia had called the 'Grand Design' approach, which sought to find meaning in 'a very broad concept of the Australian federation'. 115 In this kind of approach, 'attribution', selfconsciously theoretical and demanding a broad constitutional vision of the integrated judicature, would find space to operate. But since Kable was decided, an historicist (though not intentionalist) methodology has become dominant. For example, to deny the status of 'defining characteristic' to a putative attribute of a court, there has been invoked in Baker the 'long history … of recommendations by trial judges to the 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ use of acting judges on colonial Supreme Courts. 117 Conversely, in order to accord 'defining' status to the supervisory jurisdiction of state Supreme Courts, the High Court in Kirk canonised as 'accepted doctrine at the time of federation' 118 the Privy Council's decision in Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan, 119 to the effect that notwithstanding a privative clause the Queen's Bench could grant certiorari to correct a manifest defect of jurisdiction or manifest fraud. 120 In Totani, 121 the Chief Justice wrote in favour of the historicist approach in Kable cases, in express contradistinction to theoretical methodology. After recording the fact that the constitutional provision for the investment of state courts with federal jurisdiction was borne out of economic concerns, rather than high constitutional theory, 122 his Honour concluded:
One does not look first to overarching principles of constitutionalism as a source of the limitations on State legislative power which have been expounded under the general rubric of the 'Kable doctrine'. Rather, it is necessary to focus upon the text and structure of Ch III and the underlying historically based assumptions about the courts, federal and State, upon which the judicial power of the Commonwealth can be conferred. It is in the need for consistency with those assumptions that the implied limitations find their source. 123 His Honour is, with respect, clearly correct that the continuing institutional integrity of the state courts is an assumption upon which the Constitution is written. And historical inquiry is, with respect, an undoubtedly important component of legal analysis for what it teaches about the origins of institutions and principles, and the path of their development into current forms. There are, however, difficulties with privileging an historical approach to discerning the content of constitutional assumptions at the expense of theoretical approaches that look to 'overarching principles of constitutionalism'.
The main difficulties lie in the non-determinative quality, for legal purposes, of historical inquiry. More specifically, the conclusions about 'defining characteristics' that an historicist methodology may logically sustain are limited. First, historical circumstance does not identify the essentiality of an attribute of a court. Courts historically, as now, possessed many attributes. Adopting an historical inquiry merely shifts in time and does not answer the substantive question of which of the many attributes were essential and which were merely accidental. Secondly, historical 
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49 ____________________________________________________________________________________ circumstance does not identify the inessentiality of an attribute. Historical inquiry may show that some characteristic was not at all an attribute of courts at federation, such that it could not have been an essential attribute at that time. But the stronger conclusion that the characteristic is not an essential attribute today requires either a non-historicist reason or the additional premise that the essential attributes of state courts have not been added to since federation. Such a premise might be true within some versions of originalism, but is inconsistent with the Court's recognition that '[i]t is neither possible nor profitable to attempt to make some single all-embracing statement of the defining characteristics of a court.' 124 Yet another difficulty with privileging historicist methodology is that whatever use is sought to be made of legal history, its content can be ambiguous and require choices not themselves explicable on historical grounds. Take, for example, the High Court's endorsement in Kirk 125 of Willan. 126 A later, contrary decision 'of a strong Full Court in Victoria', 127 In re Biel, 128 was referred to during argument but not referred to in the reasons for judgment. Biel is surely explicable, but it is not explicable on simply historical grounds: only grounds of principle can say why the decision was wrong when it was decided, or why it should not govern the question in Kirk. 129 Without a principled explication of the kind advanced by counsel during the hearing, one could imagine an argument along the historicist line: 'The privative clause cases turn on the construction of particular statutes and Biel is evidence of the contemplation at the time of federation of a well-drafted privative clause effectively ousting certiorari for jurisdictional error; ergo the supervisory jurisdiction cannot be considered a defining characteristic of a state Supreme Court'. I do not assume the burden of this argument, but merely describe its form to illustrate the limitations of historicist methodology.
3
Evaluative judgment A further reason why an account of attributes, still less an historical account, does not sufficiently explain the Kable principle is that the constitutional result in a Kable case is not determined by the identification of a defining characteristic, which will typically be expressed in highly general language. The constitutional result is reached 'by an evaluative process which may require consideration of a number of factors.' 130 The question is whether the impugned legislation substantially impairs, or is incompatible with, the particular characteristic, or is repugnant to it 'in a fundamental degree'. 131 In
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ measuring a specific enactment against highly general and abstract descriptions of a court's defining characteristics, a degree of judgment is called for as to the substantiality of any impairment. As Gummow J said in Fardon, 'the critical notions of repugnancy and incompatibility are insusceptible of further definition in terms which necessarily dictate future outcomes'. 132 The identification of defining characteristics is disjoined from the real constitutional task.
Interestingly, French CJ has likened the evaluative process to 'that involved in deciding whether a body can be said to be exercising judicial power' 133 and, with Kiefel J, described its necessity as 'consistent with the imprecise scope of the judicial power, which historically was not limited to the determination of existing rights and liabilities in the resolution of controversies between subject and subject, or between subject and the Crown.' 134 Their Honours continued:
It is also consistent with the shifting characterisation of the so-called 'chameleon' functions as administrative or judicial according to whether they are conferred upon an authority acting administratively or upon a court. Assessments of constitutional compatibility between administrative and judicial functions are not to be answered by the application of a Montesquieuan fundamentalism. 135 This very explicit linking of the Kable question with concepts drawn directly from separation-of-powers analysis is striking, and consistent with the rise of an attributesbased theory that I have been describing.
4
Summary The emergence of the 'defining characteristics' of a court as the touchstone of 'institutional integrity' has masked the true basis of the Kable principle. We now theorise the attributes, rather than the attribution, of state courts, but in doing so cannot sufficiently account for the Kable principle, which from its inception demanded a theory of attribution. How conceptions of attribution can supplement the ascendant account is the subject of the next section.
III ATTRIBUTION OF STATE COURTS: SUPPLEMENTING THE ASCENDANT ACCOUNT
A Recovering Kable as a doctrine of federalism Kable, as Part I explained, sought to negotiate conflicting commitments to autonomous states and integrated courts; to state courts as both 'creatures of the States' and 'hav[ing] a role and existence which transcends their status as courts of the States'. 136 In doing so, the decision identified the important question of the proper attribution of state courts, by substantially qualifying the prevailing orthodoxy that the Commonwealth must take state courts as it finds them and by signalling that the proper attribution of state courts to the states is not absolute. As the attributes-based account has gained ascendancy, this question of attribution has remained unanswered. Attention to this question, however, can remedy, in part, the deficiencies in the ascendant, attributes-based account. Part II identified three deficiencies, namely, the conclusory nature of statements of defining characteristics; the limitations of the dominant historicist methodology; and the disjunction from the pivotal 'evaluative judgment'.
1
Statements of conclusion A conception of attribution, whether strong or weak, provides extrinsic reasons (though not necessarily the only ones) of the necessary kind to justify the identification of certain attributes as 'defining characteristics' or otherwise. For example, Bradley 137 and Forge 138 exemplify how a commitment to strong attribution, at least in respect of the constitution and organisation of courts, counsels against any imposition of a single national formula for the terms and conditions of judicial appointment. A more recent instance of a strong conception of attribution affecting the conclusion reached on a Kable question is found in the dissenting opinion in Totani. 139 Heydon J described a need to confine the scope of the Kable principle and to that end described the states as 'jurisdictions in which experiment may be conducted and variety may be observed'. 140 That expresses a particular theory of the place of the states within the federation and one that is consonant with a strong conception of the attribution of state courts. It illustrates the relationship, not widely recognised, between the commitment to autonomous states and the scope of implied limitations on state (not just Commonwealth) legislative power.
Commitments to weaker conceptions of attribution, on the other hand, would counsel more intrusive, or at least more detailed and specific, selection of 'defining characteristics' in aid of decreasing diversity between state judicial systems, and bridging the gap between state and federal limitations. The legitimacy, under such commitments, of 'experiment', as Heydon J called it, by states upon courts conceived to fulfill a national function would be questionable, to say the least. The extension to the states of a minimum standard of judicial review for jurisdictional error 141 and of a minimum standard of compatibility required of functions conferred on judicial officers as personae designatae 142 are recent examples. The invalidity, favoured by three judges, of conferring power to make 'declarations of inconsistent interpretation' based on the model of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), 143 came close to being another example of a uniform national standard erected on a theory of weak attribution.
Whether strong or weak, conceptions of attribution precede the identification of the 'defining characteristics' of state courts. They offer at least partial reasons and justifications for what is otherwise a bare conclusion that a putative attribute is essential or inessential. 
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History and theory Moreover, the kinds of reasons offered by conceptions of attribution are necessarily those grounded in legal principle and theory. The concept of 'attribution' demands a principled vision of the integrated judicial system, and its relation to the overall federal structure and the continued existence of that structure's constituent units. I have not sought to insist upon any particular vision -only that one is required. To the extent that historicist approaches to identifying the defining characteristics of courts are limited in the ways earlier described, an attribution-based analysis is a promising supplement.
It was not obviously inevitable that an attributes-based approach to the Kable principle be tethered to historicist methodology. After all, a theory of 'mark[ing] … court[s] apart from other decision-making bodies', 144 which references separation-ofpowers principles, could pick up the functional concerns, entrenched values, and strong roots in legal theory that those principles engage. But because it is denied (correctly) that the separation of powers is the source of the Kable principle, 145 its rich theoretical resources remain largely inaccessible, at least openly. Coupled with the independent rise, more generally, of historicist forms of argument and something like a constitutional 'originalism', the attributes-based approach, disabled from drawing too explicitly on separation-of-powers theory, lends itself to preoccupation with historicism.
'Attribution', on the other hand, does not lend itself to purely historical analysis because it is itself a functional concept. And it engages a theoretical apparatus that is more satisfactory because it does constitute the normative foundation of the Kable principle -the nature of the federation, and the accommodation of autonomous states and integrated courts. The force of the concept may be seen, for example, in Kirk, where in addition to ascertaining the position at the time of federation, the Court justified entrenching the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts by reference specifically to legal theory and functional considerations. The justification was expressed as a reassertion of the 'one common law of Australia' and the impermissibility of 'islands of power immune from supervision and restraint' and the 'development of "distorted positions"'. 146 The parallel historical and theoretical justifications in Kirk were articulated separately, in consecutive paragraphs, 147 and without much indication as to any specific relation between the two, suggesting that they were independent, but mutually reinforcing, reasons for the conclusion reached. The principled reasons clearly flowed from a vision of state courts in their 'transcendent' role, as parts of an integrated system. In other words, they flowed from an analysis of attribution, as I have been describing it.
3
Evaluative judgment Finally, 'attribution', unlike 'attributes', engages with the real constitutional question in a Kable case. The gradient that is inherent within the concept of 'attribution' -strong to weak -aligns with the evaluative judgment for which application of the Kable principle calls. Commitment to a stronger or weaker conception of attribution will nudge the evaluation of an impugned law against the Kable principle towards, respectively, permissive or robust review. Australian constitutional law does not employ the categorical standards of review known in some other jurisdictions (rational basis review, as distinct from strict scrutiny, for example). 148 Nevertheless, the idea is that the evaluative judgment central to the Kable principle, like all questions of judgment, is amenable to different standards of application, and will likely attract a more deferential, or permissive, application under a strong conception of attribution, and a more robust application under a weak conception. If that be correct, it illustrates the significance of confronting the question of attribution. It also shows how clarifying the underlying conceptions of attribution that necessarily subsist in Kable decisions will make the evaluative process more transparent and accessible to subjects of the law (including state governments and legislators), and more structured in its application by courts and counsel.
B
Explaining the Kable principle's inertia and revival The case for taking the concept of attribution seriously, and examining its interpretations and implications more closely, is strengthened by the ability of that concept to explain a particularly puzzling feature of the Kable principle: its remaining inert for 13 years, and its current revival. I argue that the period of inertia was produced by implicit commitment to the orthodox and traditional strong conception of attribution, which now, in a period of Kable's revival, shows signs of weakening.
1
Inertia as strong attribution The inertia that gathered around the application of the Kable principle manifested in three judicial techniques. First, Kable was distinguished as a truly exceptional case about truly exceptional legislation. Thus, in Fardon, 149 the preventive detention regime was upheld because of its differences from the CPA -not being directed at one particular person, and not in substance disguising a legislative or executive decision, for example. Gleeson CJ said: 'The minor premise of the successful argument in Kable was specific to the legislation there in question' 150 and McHugh J opined: 'Kable is a decision of very limited application … the result of legislation that was almost unique in the history of Australia.' 151 Similarly, Gummow J described the result in Kable as flowing from 'a particular combination of features of [the CPA]'. 152 Secondly, when Kable challenges attacked the composition of state and territory courts, 153 as distinct from the functions conferred upon them, the High Court explicitly sanctioned diversity in the constitution and organisation of non-federal courts, 154 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ impartiality. French CJ recently reaffirmed leeway for diverse composition, observing that the Kable principle 'makes ample allowance for diversity in the constitution and organisation of courts'. 155 Thirdly, and coming to prominence in Gypsy Jokers 156 and KGeneration, 157 was the deployment of the interpretive principle that statutes should be construed to avoid where possible the result that the statute is invalid. 158 Each case concerned a legislative regime which appeared to require a court to depart from normal standards of procedural fairness. Broadly speaking, the legislation authorised a court to receive and act on material classified by an executive officer to be confidential (because its disclosure would prejudice criminal investigations, for example) and not to be disclosed to the affected party. In each case, the legislation was construed to permit the courts to satisfy themselves that the classification was properly made, and to permit the courts the usual discretion to 'mould their procedures' 159 concerning disclosure to parties and their legal representatives. The constructions placed a degree of strain upon the ordinary meaning of the provisions, adding to the statutes what later was labelled 'a counterintuitive judicial gloss'. 160 This period of inertia coincided with the emergence of the attributes-based account. A strong conception of attribution prevailed throughout this period because, as explained in Part I, strong conceptions are orthodox and traditional and require novel arguments to displace them. Displacement did not occur because the emergence of the attributes-based account diverted attention from the question of attribution. The reluctance to invalidate state legislation on Kable grounds can be seen as a manifestation of a concern to permit the states wide freedom to regulate 'their own' courts. On the other hand, the repeated reaffirmation in broad terms of the Kable principle can be seen as recognition that the discretion and diversity contemplated was not unconfined.
The strong conception of attribution is discernible in Austin v Commonwealth, 161 which was decided during the period of Kable's inertia. Because Austin is not a Kable case, it is an important, independent confirmation of my thesis. Austin concerned a challenge to federal legislation imposing taxation upon the superannuation benefits of state judges. The challenge was successfully maintained on the basis of the commitment to autonomous states or, more precisely, the constitutional principle, identified with Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth, 162 that the federal structure of the Constitution renders the Commonwealth Parliament incompetent to curtail the capacity of the states to function as governments. So the majority judges reasoned, 
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55 ____________________________________________________________________________________ setting the conditions for appointment and remuneration of state judges is a function committed to the states and which the impugned federal legislation impaired. What is interesting for present purposes is the anxious qualification that whether 'it is critical to the constitutional integrity of the States that they alone have the capacity to give directions to their officials and determine what duties they perform … is a large proposition and best left for another day.' 163 164 There is inherent in the reservation an instinct as to the significance of the national character of the judicial system. The instinct is tempered by the recognition that the states possess independent discretion in respect of state courts. Fundamentally, the issue in Austin is the same as the issue in all the Kable cases: how much autonomy do states have with respect to state courts? The outcome in Austin differed because Commonwealth legislation was challenged, but the attitude underlying the guarded qualification to the result is precisely the attitude underlying the Kable principle's period of inertia. Incidentally, this identification of the one, coherent conception of attribution underlying both the Kable cases and Austin is an answer to Kirby J's apparent suggestion that Austin was inconsistent with the narrow approach to the Kable principle in the pre-2009 period. 165
2
Revival as weak attribution Since 2009, the Kable principle has been applied to invalidate legislation in International Finance, 166 Totani 167 and Wainohu. 168 It should have been applied, in the opinions of three judges, in Momcilovic. 169 And it provided the basis for a successful appeal, falling short of invalidation, in Kirk. 170 It is significant to see how the revival may be explained on the basis of a changing conception of attribution.
(a)
International Finance The Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) ('CARA') purported to authorise a procedure by which the NSW Crime Commission could apply ex parte to the Supreme Court for an order restraining a person from dealing with specified property on suspicion of the person having engaged in serious crime related activities. The majority judgments differed in their reasons for finding the provision to be invalid. For French CJ, the direction that the court must consider the Commission's application ex parte substantially impaired the Supreme Court's institutional integrity by removing a normal discretion to consider whether or not to proceed ex parte. 171 For Gummow and Bell JJ and Heydon J, the vice was not in this curtailment of discretion but in the absence or preclusion of the normal facility by which a person, against whom an ex 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ parte restraining order is made, may apply for that order to be set aside at an inter partes hearing. 172 Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ dissented, holding that the CARA, properly construed, did not preclude that normal facility. 173 The approach to statutory construction distinguishes the majority and minority judgments. It also distinguishes the majority approach from preceding Kable cases, in particular, Gypsy Jokers and K-Generation. The interpretive principle favouring valid over invalid constructions guides, but cannot dictate, outcomes: there always falls to be made a judgment whether the words of the statute can reasonably bear the valid meaning. The exercise is always controlled by the degree of strain that the court is prepared to tolerate. Constructions may be more or less strained, more or less contrary to the literal or apparent meaning of the language. The minority in International Finance, consistent with the approach in Gypsy Jokers and K-Generation, 174 accepted a degree of strained construction that ensured validity but from which the majority recoiled. French CJ articulated the shift in approach and explained the limits to the principle of avoiding constitutional invalidity by strained, or non-literal, construction, referring to the need to respect Parliament's choices, even if the consequence is invalidity, and the entitlement of the community to rely on 'the ordinary sense of the words'. 175 His Honour then added in the critical passage:
To the extent that a statutory provision has to be read subject to a counterintuitive judicial gloss … there is a real risk that, notwithstanding a judicial gloss which renders less draconian or saves from invalidity a provision of a statute, the provision will be administered according to its ordinary, apparent and draconian meaning. 176 The Chief Justice's explanation illustrates the connection between the approaches to statutory construction and the concept of a court's attribution. In at least two ways, strained construction to avoid invalidity affords solicitude to the states and their perceived wide powers over 'their own' courts. First, as French CJ explained, strained construction countenances the possibility that the statute will be administered 'according to its ordinary, apparent and draconian meaning' and so countenances the possibility of in-practice transgressions of the Kable principle. Especially in contexts of sensitivity vis-à-vis procedural fairness -ex parte hearings and confidential evidence, for example -the risk that transgressions go undetected and unenforced is amplified. In this way, strained construction is a form of under-enforcement of the Kable norm. 177 Secondly, the avoidance (or not) of invalidity serves a symbolic as well as substantive function. Amelia Simpson has argued that 'it may be impossible to secure State 181 In contrast, the constructional theory adopted in International Finance, which evinced less toleration for strained constructions, resonates with a weaker conception of attribution. It reinforces, symbolically and substantively, the reach of the Kable principle and expressly sets itself in opposition to the possibility of deviant administration of the law within the state.
(b)
Kirk Soon after International Finance, the High Court invoked the Kable principle again in Kirk. The case concerned the efficacy of a state privative clause and, while not invalidating the clause, the Court construed it as ineffective to oust review for jurisdictional error explicitly on the basis that it could not validly do so. 182 Considerations of federalism and the attribution of state courts, while arising only implicitly in the competing approaches to statutory construction in International Finance, were central to the Court's reasoning in Kirk. I have already described how the Court supplemented historical inquiry with reasoning based on theory and principle, referring to the single common law for Australia, and a functional objection to 'islands of power immune from supervision and restraint' within the federal structure. These considerations are sympathetic with a vision of the judicial system that is more unitary than federal and in which state courts are, accordingly, only weakly attributable.
(c)
Totani and Wainohu Subsequent cases continued to express the momentum, gathered in International Finance and Kirk, behind the weaker conception of attribution and a reinvigorated Kable principle. In Totani, the Court held invalid s 14(1) of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA). That section required the Magistrates Court of South Australia, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, to make a control order against a person, if that person was found to be a member of a 'declared organisation', being an organisation declared by the Attorney-General under a separate provision. The Magistrates Court had to be satisfied that the person the subject of the Commissioner's application was, in fact, a 'member' (defined very expansively) of the organisation, but otherwise had no role in assessing whether the person had engaged in, or was likely to engage in, any particular conduct, nor in assessing the facts underpinning the
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Attorney-General's decision to declare the organisation. The dominance of the executive in the decision-making process leading to a control order was critical, though the reasons of the majority judges differed somewhat in emphasis. Constitutional infirmity was identified in the conscription of the court to 'implement decisions of the executive' 183 or 'effectuate … [the] political function [of declaring an organisation]' 184 or 'give effect to legislative and executive policy'. 185 Crennan and Bell JJ appeared to place additional emphasis on the 'depart[ure] … from the ordinary judicial processes' involved in making the control order. 186 Hayne J, with whom French CJ agreed, 187 emphasised the enlistment of the court to 'create new norms of conduct', backed by criminal sanction, 'upon the motion of the Executive', applicable to persons 'chosen by the Executive' and 'without inquiring about what the subject of that norm has done, or may do in the future'. 188 Notwithstanding the different emphases, some commonalities, relevant to the present argument, may be identified. First, there was little disagreement about the construction of the statute and the mechanics of the process it prescribed. Consistent both with the parties' submissions and with the approach in International Finance, there was no appetite for attempting to strain the construction of the legislation to preserve its validity. Significantly in this respect, the dissenting judge criticised the respondents for 'construing [the provision] … adversely to constitutional validity [and] persistently ignor[ing] the contrary principles of statutory construction'. 189 Secondly, it was never doubted that the Kable principle requires that state courts retain the essential attributes of actual and perceived independence from the executive branch: the decision turned upon the 'evaluative process' of scrutinizing the legal and practical operation of the impugned provision against the Kable standard. The non-unanimity of the decision is an unremarkable instance of differing, but reasonable, views being taken on a question calling for judgment on matters of degree and substantiality. The robust approach of the majority is consistent with my earlier observations about the relationship between conceptions of attribution and the standard of review. Similarly, Heydon J's more permissive evaluation appeared to follow from premises rooted explicitly in a strong conception of attribution, as I explained previously. 190 Wainohu is an even clearer manifestation of the implicitly weakening conception of attribution. The Court held invalid the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW), which empowered the Supreme Court of New South Wales to make control orders against members of declared organisations. Unlike the scheme considered in Totani, an organisation would be 'declared' by an 'eligible judge' of the Supreme Court acting as persona designata. The judge was expressly not required to give reasons for a declaration. This feature was considered to be inconsistent with the 'essential incident[s] of the judicial function'. 191 The power was conferred, however, not on a _____________________________________________________________________________________ 200 and 'the maintenance of a national economy'. 201 The Kable principle, whether in a robust or permissive form, relies upon some theory of state courts and their degree of 'integration' into a national judicial system. To confront the question of 'integration' as a structural, theoretical problem would not be to commit the 'federal balance' error.
A third answer, now explored in detail, is that the federalism concerns implicit in Kable cases have been suppressed by an absence of conflict between the Commonwealth and the states. Federal conflicts, when litigated, are typically characterised by an opposition of Commonwealth and state interests. Commonwealth and state interests in the Kable principle might have diverged, but until recently, for reasons I explain, they instead converged. Consequently, Kable cases typically presented, procedurally, as a united front of state and Commonwealth governments all defending together wide legislative power over courts. So-litigated, the Kable principle unsurprisingly took on its ascendant complexion as a principle concerned with the attributes of courts in general, and protecting them from governmental schemes in general, rather than a principle of federalism in which the Commonwealth and state governments might have opposing interests. I explain how this posture came to be typical by analysing the pattern of interventions by the Commonwealth AttorneyGeneral in Kable litigation. In doing so, I also show how and why in recent cases, the Commonwealth has diverged from the states and how in significant instances this has coincided with the revival of the Kable principle.
The interests of the several governments come to be represented in constitutional matters through the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), which confers on Commonwealth and state Attorneys-General a right to intervene in proceedings 'that relate to a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation'. 202 The statutory right to intervene is made effective by a duty on the courts not to proceed with the matter unless satisfied that the Attorneys-General have been notified with sufficient time to consider intervening. 203 Provision for governmental intervention reflects the wider public interests at stake in constitutional matters that private parties may not adequately address. Whether or not to intervene and what submissions to make are for an Attorney-General to decide in his or her discretion. 204 
____________________________________________________________________________________
Since the Kable principle is restrictive of state legislative power, state governments have an obvious interest in defending state laws. Even a state whose laws are not directly challenged in a particular proceeding will have an interest in the outcome, since an adverse decision may invite new challenges or, at least, curtail its own capacity to enact similar laws. The Commonwealth's policy interest is more nuanced. The Kable principle ensures the continued existence of fit receptacles for the conferral of the judicial power of the Commonwealth pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution and, in this sense, exists for the benefit of Commonwealth interests. In the abstract, a Commonwealth that routinely intervened in Kable cases against the states and in favour of relative homogeneity, by detailed prescription of the minimum requirements for state courts, is eminently conceivable. How the Commonwealth came in fact to intervene in support of the states is an interesting development.
B
'Intervention' in Kable The interventions in Kable itself were complicated by the fact that new constitutional issues arose before the High Court during argument. On the basis of the original notice, the Attorneys-General for Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia intervened. New South Wales' interests were represented because its Director of Public Prosecutions was the respondent to the appeal. The Commonwealth did not intervene, but availed itself of an opportunity to file written submissions when new arguments based on Chapter III were raised during the hearing. 205 The reported summary of those submissions indicates that the Commonwealth offered only qualified support for the impugned legislation. It submitted that 'the doctrine of the separation of judicial power forms no part of the entrenched constitutional framework of the States.' 206 But, the report continues:
This does not mean that the Constitution contains no implications which limit the power of a State legislature to confer non-judicial powers or functions on State courts or judges or to regulate or control the exercise of judicial power by a State court. The Constitution creates an 'integrated system of law'. 207 Thus, the Commonwealth's position in Kable itself aligned quite closely with the result. Its qualified nature foreshadowed the federal tensions at the heart of the Kable principle as originally articulated.
C
Interventions after Kable and the logic of Bachrach The Commonwealth's position immediately after Kable is difficult to discern, for it tended not to intervene in cases in which the Kable principle was raised unless the
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ validity of a Commonwealth law was in question. 208 The vast majority of the cases were in lower courts, necessarily subject to review by the High Court, which probably explains sufficiently the Commonwealth's disinclination to intervene. Bachrach 209 is the crucial exception. A Queensland statute was challenged in the High Court on Kable grounds. South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales each intervened in support of Queensland. The Commonwealth did not intervene. A unanimous court published reasons that would profoundly shape the Commonwealth's subsequent policy:
Kable took as a starting point the principles applicable to courts created by the Parliament under s 71 and to the exercise by them of the judicial power of the Commonwealth under Ch III. If the law in question here had been a law of the Commonwealth and it would not have offended those principles, then an occasion for the application of Kable does not arise. 210 The court hypothesised a valid Commonwealth enactment, and concluded that state legislation in equivalent terms would not offend the Kable principle. It is the contrapositive proposition that is problematic for Commonwealth interests: if a state enactment is found to be invalid on Kable grounds, it must follow, according to Bachrach, that a Commonwealth enactment in equivalent terms would also breach Chapter III. Bachrach thus illuminated a Commonwealth interest in the validity of state legislation. By describing Commonwealth legislative power as narrower than state legislative power over analogous subject-matter, the Court gave the Commonwealth a reason to defend wide state legislative power. For the Commonwealth, this interest conflicts with that in maintaining the national judicial system through confining state legislative power over state courts.
The Commonwealth's common fate with the states in Kable cases is evident in its oral submissions made in Baker, 211 one of the next cases to reach the High Court. 212 
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ position of support for the states. Departure has not occurred in all cases, 219 but there are sufficient instances to infer an emergent measure of nuance in the Commonwealth's intervention positions. The claim is not that a shift in Commonwealth policy caused the revival of the Kable principle. After all, the Commonwealth did support the states -unsuccessfully -in International Finance. 220 The claim is more subtle: just as the Commonwealth's support for the states after Bachrach enabled the ascendance of the attributes-based account of the Kable principle, and just as it enabled the reinforcement of the orthodox, strong conception of attribution, the Commonwealth's departures from that position of support are enabling a renewed federalism-based approach to the Kable principle and, perhaps, a weaker conception of attribution.
1
Extending Chapter III to the states The Commonwealth's opposition to the states in Kable cases since 2009 has been most common in circumstances where, because the Constitution would undoubtedly preclude the Commonwealth from enacting legislation analogous to the impugned state law, the logic of Bachrach was inapplicable and any argument along Bachrach's lines foreclosed. I explained previously the tension between the Commonwealth interests in preserving its own legislative power from an adverse Kable decision and in protecting, or even advancing, the integrated system of courts. Thus, when it has no relevant legislative power of its own at stake, the interest in defending state legislation diminishes and the interest in integrated courts augments. Three examples have manifested in the recent cases.
(a) Kirk In Kirk, the Commonwealth intervened against the states and successfully argued that the supervisory jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional error by a lower court was a 'defining characteristic' of a state Supreme Court. 221 This 'in substance … equated State administrative law, in this respect, with the position under s 75(v) of the Constitution', 222 which entrenches the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant constitutional writs for jurisdictional error. Having lost its own battle over privative clauses in Plaintiff S157, 223 the Commonwealth was free in Kirk to advance its theory of integrated courts, premised on a weaker conception of attribution. In the resulting argument between the Commonwealth and states, the federal dimension to the Kable point was explicit, explaining in part the attention paid in Kirk, not characteristic of all the Kable cases, to federalism considerations.
(b)
Wainohu Similarly, and as explained previously, Wainohu extended to the states the principles in the federal sphere which limit the valid conferral of non-judicial functions on judges ____________________________________________________________________________________ acting as personae designatae. The Court expressly attributed the new convergence of principle to an acceptance of the submissions of the Commonwealth Attorney-General as intervener. 224 Although the Commonwealth, on the facts, 'support[ed] the New South Wales legislation in its totality', 225 it actively argued, against state interests, that the conferral of functions upon a state judge acting as persona designata is subject to the same limitations as the analogous conferral of functions on a federal judge, and expressly sought to identify a common constitutional foundation for both Kable and Wilson. 226 New South Wales conducted its defence on a consistent assumption, though it appeared not necessarily to concede the point, 227 while Victoria, as intervener, actively resisted the Commonwealth's submission, arguing unsuccessfully that Wilson had no application in the state sphere by reason of there being no separation of powers. 228 The dissenting judge's observation, that '[t]o take the step which the Commonwealth's submissions entail is not to apply the Kable doctrine, but to move a step beyond it', 229 highlights the significance to the development of the Kable principle of the Commonwealth electing to intervene against state interests to advance its vision of the integrated judicial system.
(c) Momcilovic Momcilovic concerned the operation of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
Act 2006 (Vic). Although no party contended for the invalidity of any part of the Charter, the possible inconsistency with the Kable principle of two provisions arose at the application for special leave. 230 The first was the command that '[s]o far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.' 231 The second was the power to make a declaration that a statutory provision cannot be interpreted consistently with a human right. 232 For the present purpose of analysing the Commonwealth's intervention position, only the first provision is of special interest. 233 The perceived difficulty with s 32, the interpretive principle, was that it might have been construed to confer upon the court a power of a legislative character, insofar as it
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ may have authorised the court to engage in 'rewriting' statutes. 234 Consistent with the trend I have identified in Kirk and Wainohu, the Commonwealth, on this point, also sought to extend aspects of Chapter III to the states. Although ultimately supportive of the Charter's validity, the Commonwealth, as Heydon J noticed, 'seemed to hover on the brink of attack'. 235 In its written submissions, the Commonwealth argued that it would contravene the Kable principle to confer on a state court a legislative function that was 'inextricably intertwined or blended' with the court's judicial functions. 236 This attempted an obvious extension to state courts of an obvious Chapter III limitation on federal courts.
In oral submissions, the extension sought went further. The Commonwealth submitted that the interpretation of state legislation, in a matter, by state courts in the exercise of state jurisdiction 'is confined to the exercise of judicial power in a Commonwealth constitutional sense'. 237 Despite recognition that the 'judicial power of the Commonwealth' is narrower than 'judicial power' generally and that state courts may therefore exercise certain judicial powers denied to federal courts, 238 in interpreting state laws, a state court must, according to the Commonwealth's submission, remain within the limits of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The Solicitor-General's development of the argument rested centrally upon a vision of the integrated system of courts with three critical aspects. First, he argued that the High Court in exercising its appellate jurisdiction to correct error in the judgment, decree, order or sentence of a state Supreme Court, 'must be able to do again and do properly what the Supreme Court itself should have done'. 239 Secondly, he argued that a state court must be able to interpret state statutes in the exercise of invested federal jurisdiction, precluding any state interpretive principle that would involve the court in an exercise of non-Chapter III judicial power. 240 Thirdly, he argued that federal courts must be able to interpret state statutes in federal jurisdiction and could not be disabled from that task by a state interpretive principle. 241 This vision of integrated courts rests also on the implicit premise that a state law has an objective construction and cannot be interpreted differently depending on whether federal or non-federal jurisdiction is exercised. But for that, the second and third aspects of the Solicitor-General's vision
